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ABSTRACT
In this paper we investigate how well banks manage their reserves. The optimal policy takes
into account expected foregone interest on excess reserves and penalty costs for going below
required reserves. Using a unique panel data-set on daily clearing house settlements of a cross-
section of Mexican banks we estimate the deposit uncertainty banks face, and in turn their optimal
reserve behavior. The most important variables for forecasting the deposit uncertainty are the
interbank fund-transfers of the day, certain calendar dates, and the interest differential between the
money market rate and the discount rate – a measure reflecting the bank’s opportunity cost of money
holdings. For most banks the model’s prediction accord relatively well with the observed reserve
behavior of banks. The model produces reserves costs that are significantly smaller relative to the
case when reserves are set via simple rule of thumb. Furthermore, alternative motives for holding
reserves (such as liquidity and reputation effects) do not seem to be the explanation for why certain
banks hold relatively large reserves.
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Banks play a major role in facilitating the way the ﬁnancial sector operates. The eﬃciency
with which banks utilize reserves is important for understanding not only operational banking
behavior but also for the role that banks play in the transmission mechanism. In this paper we
analyze banks’ reserve operations and quantify the extent to which their reserve management
policy is optimal – in a sense of minimizing expected reserve costs.
The reserve management problem is interesting because of the inherent asymmetry in
costs incurred by the foregone interest when the bank meets its reserve requirement and the
alternative, more expensive, case in which the bank incurs a penalty cost for having reserves
fall below the reserve requirement. A key ingredient in assessing the probability that the
reserves of a bank will fall short of its reserve requirement is the stochastic process for the
bank’s deposits and withdrawals. Given this process and some other relevant state variables
the bank’s optimal decision can be deduced. The uncertainty and therefore the resulting
reserve position at the beginning of the next day is due to the fact that certain operations
of withdrawals and deposits take place after the bank sets its overnight reserve position.
Therefore, much of our empirical eﬀort is aimed at estimating this stochastic process. Given
our estimates of this process we derive the predicted optimal reserve positions. Based on
the latter, the actual reserve costs are compared to the estimated costs had the banks set
their reserve positions according to the model. This comparison reveals the degree to which
banks follow an optimal decision process for managing their overnight reserves and the costs
for not doing so.
The panel data set and the environment we study are quite unique. The data set contains
daily observations on the reserve positions as well as other components of the balance sheet
for all banks in Mexico during the years 1990-1991. This data set allows us to estimate
the stochastic process for deposits and withdrawals in a relatively precise way. During this
period the Mexican banking system had a very simple structure — a feature that provides a
2laboratory environment for our research question. In contrast to the U.S. system, the central
bank in Mexico essentially served as a payment clearing house; therefore, there were no oﬃcial
reserve requirements, there were no signiﬁcant reputation issues such as excessive use of the
discount window, nor were there any complications arising from Wednesday settlements as
they were done every night. Moreover, the panel structure of the data allows us to address
not only the reserve behavior over time but also systematic diﬀerences in behavior across
banks. Finally, reserve management is quantitatively a signiﬁcant issue. For example, during
1990 the annual reserve costs of the Mexican banking industry (equivalent to 180 million
dollars) was about 10% of the industry’s total proﬁt. Thus reserve management could have
an important quantitative eﬀect on banks’ overall proﬁtability and deviation from optimal
rules could translate into large reductions in the operating proﬁts.
We ﬁnd that a good forecast of the overnight withdrawals — the key variable generating
overnight payment uncertainty — is based on a few types of intra-day operations. The
forecasts of the overnight withdrawals result in good predictions of the reserve behavior
undertaken by most banks. Overall, the model’s reserve prediction seem to accord relatively
well with observed reserve behavior. Speciﬁcally for 9 out of the 19 banks in our sample,
we ﬁnd insigniﬁcant diﬀerences between the model’s predicted reserve behavior and the
reserves actually used by the banks. For some banks, the model’s predicted reserve position
results in larger costs, although those are not statistically signiﬁcant. These banks engage
in many activities for which the bank is likely to have a better information set than the
econometrician. For some of the other banks, the model produces somewhat lower reserve
costs. For these banks, particularly the regional banks, the reserves are on average larger
than what the model predicts – lending some support to the idea that other factors (such
as reputation, liquidity, etc.) may govern the level of reserves. However, these alternative
motives do no seem to be statistically signiﬁcant. Finally, the model prediction are quite
robust. The model produces reserves costs that are signiﬁcantly smaller relative to the case
when reserves are set via simple rule of thumb.
3In terms of prior work, there are numerous classical papers on optimal cash management
and the precautionary demand for money (e.g., Baumol (1952), Tobin (1958), Miller and
Orr (1966), Hausman and Sanchez-Bell (1975), Frenkel and Jovanovic (1980), Whalen
(1986)). Some recent papers examine more directly banks’ reserve policy (e.g., Cothren and
Waud (1994), Angelini (1998), Furﬁne (1998), Clouse and Elmendorf (1997)). Speciﬁcally,
Bartolini, Bertola, and Prati (2001) examine the eﬀect of the ”reserve maintenance period”
on banks’ reserves and the interaction with the supply of federal funds. As in their case, our
theory emphasizes the asymmetric role minimum reserve requirements and their penalty costs
introduce into the reserve management problem. In particular, our empirical methodology
combines panel data with non-linear time series characterization for the stochastic process
for deposits and withdrawals. Our main contribution is in combining this characterization
of banks’ deposit uncertainty with a model for managing reserves to structurally examine
how uncertainty inﬂuences banks’ reserve behavior.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 models the optimization problem faced
by a typical bank. Section 3 describes the characteristics of the data set and some speciﬁc
institutional characteristics of the Mexican banking and ﬁnancial sector. Section 4 describes
the estimation methodology and the empirical results. Section 5 provides conclusions.
2 Model
In this section we develop a model for the optimum level of reserves for a typical bank. In
Mexico, the eﬀective reserve requirement is zero. However, a negative balance results in a
penalty at a relatively high rate. This restriction lends itself to a speciﬁcation in which at
every period t, the bank has the objective of avoiding the penalty cost without incurring the
opportunity cost due to positive excess reserves represent.1 To introduce some notation, let
1Since the Mexican system does not have the two-week Wednesday clearing mechanism the problem the
bank faces lacks any intertemporal aspect (at least as far as reserves are concerned) and is essentially a one
period problem. It can be easily shown that the multi-period minimization problem with respect to reserve
management will reduce to the one period cost minimization discussed below.
4a bank start the day with a certain balance in the reserve account, yt, where for simplicity,
we eliminate the bank index i. During the day the bank performs operations in the money
and capital markets that generate incoming and outgoing payments to and from the reserve
account. We deﬁne odt as the net incoming payments.
In addition to the set of operations performed during the day, odt, there are overnight
operations aﬀecting the balance of the account. These operations come from the settlement
of the nation-wide clearing houses, and they can be divided into two types. First, the bank
receives check deposits during the day that are cleared only overnight, z1t. Second, the
bank’s customers issue checks that are deposited at other banks, z2t. The ﬁrst type of check
deposits, z1t, increases the balance of the bank’s reserve account. In spite of the fact that
these operations are cleared during the night they are perfectly known to the bank as of 5
PM – the time the bank must set its overnight reserve position. Hence, the bank can fully
anticipate the eﬀects of z1t in setting its reserve position. Deposits at other banks, z2t, are
withdrawals, from the bank’s standpoint, and will reduce its balance account at the central
bank. Note that these operations are unknown to the bank as of 5 PM. The uncertainty
with respect to z2t prevents the bank from perfectly controlling the end-of-day balance, and
creates the random realization of its reserve balance at the beginning of next period.
Let Ω1t denote the information known to the bank by 5 PM. This information includes
the payments during the day, odt; and the check deposits z1t: Thus, Ω1t depicts the state of
the system when the window of operations aﬀecting the reserve account is closed. Without
loss of generality, we deﬁne the position of the reserve account at 5 PM as:
y5t = yt + odt + trt (1)
where trt is the amount the bank decides (at 5PM) to transfer to its reserve account based
on the information Ω1t: Note that trt can be negative if the bank chooses to reduce its reserve
position. Following our description, the balance at the end of the day follows,
5yt+1 = y5t + z1t ¡ z2t
We assume that the stochastic process z2t is drawn from a cumulative diﬀerentiable
distribution function F(¢), with a corresponding probability density function f(¢) – possibly
dependent on an observable vector Xt ½ Ω1t. The realized reserve costs are then,
Ct+1 = yt+1r
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The ﬁrst term is the foregone interest (the overnight Repo rate, rD
t ) when there are positive
reserves; the second term reﬂects the positive costs when the reserve position is negative, in
which case the investment opportunities at rD
t has to be subtracted from the penalty costs
rP
t .2
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f(dz2t) = 0 (4)
Since z2t is always positive we let lnz2t to be normally distributed with mean ¹t and
variance ¾t. In that case, note that
R 1
y5t+z1t f(z2t)dz2t = Pr(z2t ¸ y5t + z1t)= Pr(lnz2t ¸
ln(y5t + z1t)) = 1 ¡ Φ(
ln(y¤
5t+z1t)¡¹t
¾t ), where Φ is the standard normal c.d.f. It then follows
that the ﬁrst order conditions can be expressed as:
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t , the right hand side is a positive number between zero and one and there
clearly exists a unique y¤
5t (tr¤
t) which solves (5). Note that Φ has time varying mean and
variance, ¹t and ¾t. This is in anticipation that the distribution function will depend on
an observable vector of variables Xt, and a time invariant vector of parameters µ, which we
write as Φ(¢jXt;µ). Thus on any given day, the optimal position, y¤
5t, will therefore be a
function of rD
t ; rP
t ; µ; and Xt. Thus in estimating the model, we ﬁrst estimate µ using data
on z2t and Xt and then use the ﬁrst order condition to derive the predicted optimal reserve
position.
3 The Mexican Banking System
In this section we provide a brief description of the Mexican Banking system and the reserve
requirements banks faced during the period of our study. The analysis performed in this
paper concentrates on the years 1990 and 1991. During this period there were no major
changes in the reserve requirements of the banks.3
The Mexican ﬁnancial system is composed of the Central Bank (Banco de Mexico),
commercial banks, security broker-dealer institutions, development banks and other auxiliary
institutions. Commercial banks are authorized to provide investment banking services and to
manage investment funds. Table 1 provides general characteristics of all Mexican commercial
banks as of December 1989. These characteristics are essentially constant throughout our
sample period. Within our sample period commercial banks were not required to hold
reserves at the central bank. Moreover, reserves held in the central bank paid no interest. In
3Central Bank procedures currently curtail the use of more recent data.
7spite of the fact that there were no statutory reserve requirements there was an explicit role
for holding a reserve account within the central bank (with a slight abuse of terminology we
will continue to refer to this account as a reserve account). These accounts, which essentially
constitute the reserve system in Mexico, are used to settle inter-bank operations such as fund
transfers, money market transactions, foreign exchange, cash deposits and withdrawals, and
the check settlement of the clearing house.
At 5 PM, banks had to decide how much money to leave at the reserve account to support
the operations generated by the settlement of the clearing house. A positive balance in the
reserve account generates a holding or opportunity cost equivalent to the current market
rate for overnight deposits. On the other hand, a short position generates a penalty cost
at a price established by the central bank’s discount rate.4 In summary, a bank has to
forecast overnight operations so that the opportunity cost of a positive end-of-day balance,
and the penalty charged for overdrafts are minimized, consistent with the model outlined in
the previous section.
The amount of excess reserves left in the reserve accounts and the cost of holding those
reserves are signiﬁcant. Consequently, improvements in the management of the reserve
account can potentially generate signiﬁcant cost reductions. For instance, in 1990 the reserves
balances generated a combined holding and penalty cost equivalent to about 180 million
dollars. These costs range from 3%-11% of the banks’ ﬁnancial proﬁts. Details regarding
banks proﬁtability measures and their reserve costs are given in Table 1.
3.1 Data
The sample data comprises operations of the reserve accounts of the 19 commercial banks
that operated in the Mexican ﬁnancial system. The data includes operations from January 1,
1990 to November 29, 1991. Once holidays and weekends are eliminated, there are 460 data
points for each of the 19 banks. The daily data was used to recreate, as much as possible,
4In our sample period the daily discount rate was three times the daily equivalent of the primary auction
of a 28-day government T-Bill rate(Cetes).
8the operational and ﬁnancial picture faced by a bank when a reserve management decision
was made. The leading dimension of our panel is the time series as we have data on daily
operations for 19 banks.
The operational data was obtained from the archives of the high-value payment system of
the Mexican Central Bank. This system tracks the operations aﬀecting the reserve account
of every bank. Using the transaction-log, we constructed time series of the operations
performed by each bank. Speciﬁcally, we constructed a time series for funds transfer (ftt),
cash deposits and withdrawals (cdt), tax related operations (txt), and the deposits and
withdrawals generated by the check clearing process (z1t;z2t). Using the beginning of day
balance, yt; and the rest of the operations during the day (ftt;cdt;txt); we construct the
position at 5 PM. Table 2 shows the basic statistics of these variables to illustrate their
importance and volatility.
To complete the operational data, we obtained ﬁnancial information relevant for the
banks’ decision. First, from historical ﬁnancial databases, we obtained the time series that
characterized the overnight penalty cost rP
t . The overnight opportunity cost, rD
t is the daily
equivalent of the 28-day Cetes Repo Rate. Second, we obtained ﬁnancial statements for
each bank to compute measures of ﬁnancial and managerial performance. In particular, we
obtained the operating cost oc, the ﬁnancial proﬁts fp, and measures of liquidity and non-
performing loans for each of these banks. Detailed information about the sources of these
data sets is given in the data Appendix.
4 Estimation and Results
In this section we describe our empirical model and the estimation results. We start our
analysis with standard OLS estimation of the overnight deposit settlement of the clearing
house, namely estimating the process for z2t. We use these OLS results as a convenient
reference point and as means to justify the speciﬁc nonlinear system we consequently use.
9Finally, based on the estimated process for z2t we derive the predicted optimal reserve
positions at 5 PM (that is y¤
5t) and compare them to the actual positions held by the banks.
4.1 The Settlement of the Clearing House
The key exogenous variable in terms of generating the uncertainty banks face is z2t. We
initially estimate a separate z2t process for each of the banks in our sample. Since we do not
have an explicit model for customer’s check writing behavior, namely the exogenous variable
z2t, we simply want a good and parsimonious statistical representation for this process. We






¯lXt¡l + ut (6)
where ut is an error term, ° is a vector multiplying a constant, a time trend t; and CALt a
vector of calendar dummy variables, ¯l is a k £ 1 vector of coeﬃcients, Xt is a 1 £ k vector
of explanatory variables, and L is the maximal number of lags used for Xt. The vector Xt
contains the variables known to the bank by 5 PM and include: lnz2t¡1; lnz1t; ftt; cdt; txt;
volt, where lnz1t is the log of check deposits received at the bank from other commercial
banks (the counterpart to z2t), ftt is the net fund transfers, cdt is the net cash deposits and
withdrawals, txt is the net federal tax related operations, and volt is the volume of operations
performed during the day.
Below we provide further description of each of the variables we use and a short
explanation for how we expect each variable to eﬀect the process lnz2t:
² Check Deposits (lnz1t) - A bank does not know the value of the checks deposited at
other banks (lnz2t) but it does know the value of deposits received during the day at
its own branches. The amount of deposits and withdrawals by customers is likely to
be linked, and therefore deposits should provide some information on the withdrawals
10activity by the bank’s customers. The coeﬃcient is expected to be positive.
² Fund Transfers (ftt) - Interbank fund transfers are used to settle operations such as
bond purchases, foreign exchange, and many other settlements. Since many interbank
operations are a consequence of an operation requested by a customer, paid by a check,
a high positive correlation is expected between fund transfers and cleared checks.
² Cash Deposits and Withdrawals (cdt) - A bank performs cash (currency) deposits and
withdrawals at the Central Bank, to fulﬁll the operational vault cash requirements of
its branches. Since a bank does not know the number of people that will go to the
branches to perform withdrawals or cash checks, it needs to forecast this demand ahead
of time. Hence, it is likely that client demand for currency is positively correlated with
the demand of checking account resources.
² Tax Collection and Disbursement (txt) - The federal tax collection and disbursement
is done through the branches of some banks. Also, banks distribute checks for federal
payments. Thus, a positive correlation is expected between tax operations and cleared
checks.
² Calendar Dates (CALt) - This vector contains a set of dummy variables capturing
calendar cycles when the bank expects more checks to be cleared. The bank expects
Thursdays (thut) to have checks with larger values than other weekdays because the
settlements of primary auction of government bonds occur on that day. Similarly, days
before and after holidays generate a higher volume of operation (bht;aht). Another
calendar eﬀect takes place at the middle and at the end of the month (d1530t), when
most workers get paid. Finally in December (dect) the number of check transactions
is increased as companies pay Christmas bonuses and the monetary base expands.
We estimate equation (6) separately for each bank ignoring the panel nature of our data.
The idea is to maintain an information structure close to that available to the banks. We start
11with the estimation of individual banks by running OLS of equation (6). We included all the
variables mentioned above with two lags for the transaction variables (lnz1t;ftt;cdt;txt)5.
The variables that were signiﬁcant for all banks (with p ¡ value < 0:10) were the fund
transfers ftt, tax payments txt, the log of check deposits lnz1t and its ﬁrst lag lnz1t¡1. Other
variables that were signiﬁcant for most of the banks are the ﬁrst lag of the clearing process
lnz2t¡1, the cash deposits cdt, the time trend t, and the dummy calendar for Thursdays thut.
The number of operations volt was not signiﬁcant. This is an indication that it is not
the number of operations but the value of them that has an eﬀect in the prediction of the
mean of the process. The ﬁrst and second lag of the transaction variables (ftt;cdt;txt) were
consistently insigniﬁcant. Other than the Thursdays thut calendar variable, there was no
other consistent calendar eﬀects. An explanation of this outcome might be that the calendar
peaks are already incorporated in the other transaction variables.
In summary, only 9 (including the intercept) of the 17 proposed variables were statistically
signiﬁcant in, at least, 70% of the banks, all with the expected signs. The larger set of
variables was never chosen according to the Akaike and Schwartz BIC criteria. Guided by
our desire for a parsimonious model we adopted the restricted model with 9 variables.6
The OLS residuals show that the variability in lnz2t seem to come in clusters. Further,
there is a large degree of conditional volatility with thick tails. The optimal decision (as
given by equation (5) is not only a function of the mean but also a function of the variance
of the clearing process (lnz2t). Thus, it is useful to have a framework that can predict well
not only the conditional mean but also the conditional variance of the stochastic process.
To model the variance we use an Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic process of
order 1, denoted ARCH(1) (see Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986)). This model suggests
that large and small forecast errors appear in clusters. In this form of heteroskedasticity the
5We also ran the regression using the credits and debits of the transaction variables (ftt;cdt;txt)
independently. For instance, using incoming and outgoing fund transfers instead of their diﬀerence. However,
this separation of the variables did not improve the R2 of the regressions.
6We also checked whether the Repo rate, the US Dollar/Peso exchange rate and the return on Mexican
Stock Exchange had signiﬁcant eﬀect on lnz2t. These were marginally signiﬁcant for a very small number
of banks and were rejected using the BIC criteria, and therefore were not included.
12variance of the forecast error depends on the size of the preceding disturbance. Thus, the
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We use Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) to determine the parameters of the
conditional mean and conditional variance of lnz2t. The parameter estimates of the lnz2t
process based on the conditional variance ARCH(1) speciﬁcation are given in Table 3.7 The
ﬁrst nine columns describe the coeﬃcients of the conditional mean. These basically follow the
patterns found using the simple OLS regression. There are reasons for why some variables
are insigniﬁcant for some banks. The four banks that do not show a signiﬁcant thut calendar
eﬀect, are not very active in the primary auction of government bonds, and therefore do
not show a consistent peak of operations on Thursdays. Second, the four banks that do not
show a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the net cash deposits and withdrawals cdt have many cash
facilities – a feature that makes the transfer of cash very ﬂexible and so this variable is less
of an indicator of future customer operations.8
The next three columns in Table 3, describe the parameter estimates of the conditional
variance (®0 and ®1) and the p-value of a Likelihood Ratio test comparing the homoskedastic
OLS system with that of the ARCH speciﬁcation. The last column provides a measure of ﬁt
via the adjusted R2. Table 3 shows that for 12 out of 19 cases the parameter ®1 is signiﬁcant.
The Likelihood Ratio (LR) test conﬁrms that the ARCH(1) speciﬁcation is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent than the one without ARCH eﬀects for almost all of the banks. Finally, to check
whether the residuals from the ARCH(1) estimation are indeed homoskedastic and are
7We also tested higher order ARCH terms, however, they were not signiﬁcant. We also experimented
with a GARCH(1;1) speciﬁcation but could not reject the ARCH(1) speciﬁcation, except for banks 7 and
10 –see details in Table 3.
8Some commercial banks operate cash facilities on behalf of the Central Bank.
13uncorrelated over time we regressed them on a host of variables (including lagged residuals,
squared residuals, and other lagged instruments such as z1 and z2. The homoskedasticity was
rejected for two banks; however, the inclusion of these variables directly in the estimation
did not yield signiﬁcant changes. The important point is that the time varying variance, ¾t,
a key variable for setting next period reserves, can be modelled as locally log-normal.
We conduct a few additional experiments. We utilized some cross-bank information in
estimating the clearing process. For each bank i, we included in addition to the variables
described above, the variables (lnz1t;ftt;cdt;txt) of banks j 6= i. This approach reﬂects
the importance of cross-industry information. Presumably, the cross-industry information
available to us is not available (at least in real time) to banks. This distinction is of interest
because such information can potentially improve predicting the appropriate reserve position.
However, in spite of the richness of these data set, the adjusted R2 (not reported) did not
show any signiﬁcant improvements. This result implies that cross-bank information does
not produce signiﬁcant improvements in the prediction of bank i’s cash withdrawal process
lnz2t.
4.2 The Decision Process
Given the estimated process for lnz2t, we derive the optimal position of the reserve account
established in (5). Recall that the solution for the optimal transfer tr¤
t; and therefore the
optimal position at y¤
5t, is based on a log-normal speciﬁcation for the random variable lnz2t.
Thus, the parameters of the density function f for lnz2t process characterize the conditional
mean ¹t(µ;Xt); and the conditional variance ¾2
t(µ;Xt).
We compute the value of the optimal position lny¤
5t for every t by solving (5):
ln(y
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This value of lny¤
5t minimizes the combination of opportunity cost and penalty cost of the
14reserve account under the assumed process for z2t. Formally, lny¤
5t should equal the observed
value for lny5t point by point. However, it is unlikely that we have the same information
set as that used by the bank, and certain variables are likely to exhibit measurement errors.
Consequently, we assume that the observed reserve position deviates from the predicted
position by Àt; an i.i.d. measurement error,
lny5t = lny
¤
5t + Àt where Àt » N(¹v;¾v) : (7)
Equation(7) serves as an overidentifying restriction on our model. In evaluating this
additional moment condition we take into account the fact that the estimates of lny¤
5t
depend on f(µ;Xt) which is estimated with some error.9
The results for the Wald test described by (7) are given in Table 4.10 Using the critical
Â2 value of 3.85 (the 5% signiﬁcance level), there are nine banks for which the model we
specify is not rejected. If we reduce the critical value to 2.71 (the 10% signiﬁcance level) only
seven banks do not reject the model. The rejection of the model by some banks makes it
evident that substantial diﬀerences can be observed across banks. To illustrate the diversity
in how well our model performs in terms of predicting banks reserves, Figures 1 and 2 plot
lny5t against lny¤
5t for the best and worst case (bank 6 and bank 18) respectively. Theory
predicts the dots should be on the 45-degree line. Bank 6 in Figure 1 has a much tighter ﬁt
in that respect.
9To account for the standard errors induced in estimating µ, it is convenient to think of our problem as
a two stage GMM estimation procedure (see Newey (1984), Ogaki (1993)). In a nutshell, the score function
of the MLE constitute the moments corresponding to the ﬁrst stage estimation of µ, while the second stage
is simply the overidentifying restriction implied by (7). Since the ﬁrst stage is an exactly identiﬁed system,
and there are no parameters to estimate in the second stage, the sum of squared errors in (7) is a Wald test
distributed as a Â2 with one degree of freedom.
10The À errors, as theory suggest, are not highly autocorrelated. Using regressions Àt were regressed on
two lags of À and one lag of z1t¡1 and z2t and were found not to be predictable.
154.3 Observed and Optimal Reserve Costs
Rejections of our model for reserves can be the outcome of either banks outperforming our
model or alternatively banks not following an optimal cost minimization policy. To get a
better insight of the decision process, we compare the cost incurred by each bank to the
one implied by the optimal value y¤
5t. That is, we add the ex-post observed z1t and z2t
to the decision value y¤
5t to obtain the optimal end-of-day balance y¤
t+1. We then compute
the daily cost implied by the optimal decision by using y¤
t+1 in the cost function (2) and
summing these values for the whole sample C¤ =
PT
t=1 Ct+1(y¤
t+1): Analogously, we compute
the overall costs based on the ex-post observed daily costs as Cob =
PT
t=1 Ct+1(yt+1):
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 5 provide a comparison of the cost based on the actual
value yt+1 and those based on y¤
t+1. The third column shows the diﬀerence between the two.
The costs based on y¤
5t outperform those based on the observed reserve positions for 7 of
the 19 cases.11 These results highlight a few issues. First, in terms of point estimates, 12
banks achieve better reserve position than is implied by the model (that is the costs based
on y¤
5t are higher than those based y5t). It it is quite plausible that these banks have more
information than we do. A source of this additional information could be details of wholesale
operations that bank treasurers usually know and that we cannot observe. In other words,
in some cases banks are aware of wholesale operations that will be settled by checks. These
operations are subcomponents of z2t of which we only have an aggregate measure. Second,
our model performs better in 7 banks. This outcome is an indication that some banks do not
use information eﬃciently or as we discuss below have some alternative objective in terms of
reserves than the one given by (4). Nonetheless, it is interesting, that in spite of the fact that
the information used in our analysis is at best equal to what the banks had at the time they
11In an attempt to improve the model’s ﬁt of (6) and therefore the prediction eﬃciency we tried several
other approaches. In particular, we tried to use the full information set increasing the number of variables
in the model to 17. The result of this exercise was an average improvement in the cost of about 0.05%.
However, this improvement did not help the model to outperform the banks reserve policy in any of the
cases in which the banks outperformed the model.
16made their decision, our model still managed to outperform the observed costs.12 Moreover,
in all of the 7 cases that our model outperforms actual costs, the Wald test based on the
reserve decision rejects the model – indicating that analyzing the relative costs is informative
beyond the statistical evaluation of equation (7).
It should be kept in mind that the cost estimated by our model, C¤; is a function of the
variable y¤
5t which in turn is estimated with some error. Based on the standard error of the
random variable C¤, we create a one-sided test that considers whether the observed cost Cob
is greater or equal to the estimated cost C¤. When we construct this test we observe that
none of the banks reject the hypothesis. That is, once standard errors are incorporated no
banks’ observed costs can be claimed to be larger than the estimated optimal costs. This in
some sense provides the strongest evidence for the claim that banks operate their reserves
policy quite well — either better than the model or statistically not more costly.
To further analyze the model’s quantitative implications for reserve costs we also compare
the model’s costs to the case when the bank follows some simple rule of thumb when setting
its reserves. We use two alternative rule of thumbs. In the ﬁrst case reserves are set so
that Et[yt+1] = 0. In the second case reserves are based on the unconditional mean and
variance of z2t. The ﬁrst rule is motivated by a ’naive’ bank that wants to set expected
reserves to zero. The second rule ignores any time variation in the mean and variance of the
clearing process. These costs are depicted in Table 5 under the columns of C¤(Et(yt+1)) and
C¤(Ez2t) respectively. These columns clearly demonstrate a large deterioration in reserve
costs relative to that implied by our baseline model. This shows that the optimal decision
rules imply distinct outcome relative to these simple rule of thumb and thus lending further
support for the model. Finally, the column marked panel in Table 5 shows the costs predicted
by the model when the panel’s (as oppose to individual) law of motion for lnz2t is imposed.
Again, the restrictions imposed by the panel estimation imply signiﬁcant deterioration in
12One caveat is that in spite of using rolling basis for computing the reserve costs, the parameters estimates
for lnz2t, the clearing process, are based on the whole sample. This is just a ﬁnite sample issue. Our results
are not sensitive to using sub-sample estimates for the clearing process.
17average costs – 2.37 times larger than the estimated costs using bank-speciﬁc process.
4.4 Alternative Motives for Reserves
Our approach thus far considered a relative simple environment where banks care only about
the ﬁnancial costs associated with reserves. The Mexican system is simpler than that of the
U.S. and there is no explicit discount window procedure. Nonetheless, one may conjecture
that reputational concerns may induce banks to hold a larger quantity of reserves than
the model would otherwise predict. For example, banks may hold more reserves than the
model imply due to other ’liquidity’ needs or to discern any problematic features in their
balance sheet such as a large fraction of non-performing loans. One indication of this is that
in general the model produces more negative events than what is actually observed. The
discrepancy can be quite large. For example, bank 18 (bank 5) produces 100 (83) negative
cases in the data while the model produces 144 (206) cases. In addition, the last two columns
of Table 4 indicate that there is some evidence that the model tends, on average, to set bank
reserves below what they in fact were. In light of this, we regress the realized excess reserves
yt+1 ¡ y¤
t+1 on a measures of liquidity and the fraction of non performing loans (both are
deﬁned in the data appendix).
First, we regress, in the cross-section, the excess reserves on the fraction of their non-
performing loans at the beginning of our sample. The idea is that those banks with a
larger fraction of non-performing loans would tend to hold more reserves – thus a positive
coeﬃcient is expected. A similar argument holds with respect to liquidity. Banks with less
liquidity require more reserves and thus a negative coeﬃcient is expected. The regression
results are reported in Table 6 Panel-A where we use for each bank its average quantities
over the sample. First, note that these results should be taken with caution as there are
only 19 banks in the cross-section. The liquidity measure has the right sign but . The
non-performing loan measure is signiﬁcant and positive. Next, we use the time series and
18relate each banks’ daily excess reserves to its non-performing loan in the previous month.13
We now run a pooled regression for the banks. Liquidity still shows up negatively, while
non-performing loans shows up positive but insigniﬁcant. Finally, we ran each bank’s excess
reserves on its liquidity and non-performing loans separately. The results (not displayed)
indicate that only ﬁve banks out of 19 have a signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient. Moreover, of
these ﬁve banks only one, bank 16, is a bank for which the model results with lower costs
than the observed ones. In all, the evidence supporting these speciﬁc alternative motives for
holding reserves is quite weak.
4.5 Other Factors and Reserve Costs
We investigate whether the eﬃciency of managing reserves measured as Cob
i ; is correlated
with ﬁnancial proﬁts. Financial proﬁts, fpi, are interest charged to customers net of interest
paid by the bank. The idea is that banks that are good at managing their investment
portfolio would also be good at managing reserves — hence generating a negative relationship
between fpi and Cob
i . Operating costs, oci; reﬂect expenses incurred by a bank in performing
its regular operations, such as employee salaries. Low operating costs may be an indication
of administrative eﬃciency. Thus a positive correlation between oci and Cob
i is an indication
that administrative eﬃciency is perhaps also associated with good reserve management.
We ran a cross sectional regression of the observed costs, Cob
i on a constant, the ﬁnancial
proﬁts fpi, the operating cost oci, a dummy for the regional banks, the number of checking
accounts (thousands) at each bank checki, and the number of branches brani – the latter two
variables capturing some measure of size. Panel C in Table 6 shows that the variables oci
and checki are positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% signiﬁcance level, whereas fpi is negative
and signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The negative sign on fpi is an indication that good ﬁnancial
performance is associated with a low cost Cob
i . Similarly, the positive sign of oci indicates
that on average banks that are have low operating costs also tend to have low reserve
13This ﬁnancial information is only available to us at a monthly frequency and we assume it is constant
throughout the month.
19costs.14 Given the size of the cross-section, these results need to be interpreted with caution.
However, they suggest that reserve management performance is likely be correlated with
other performance measures of banks.15
5 Conclusions
We formalize banks’ reserve decision and characterize empirically, in the context of the
Mexican ﬁnancial system, some of the factors that inﬂuence the reserve management
behavior. This system is unique in its simplistic institutional structure and aﬀords an
environment that is very close to the one studied in models of optimization under uncertainty
of cash management. The data set provides a unique opportunity for investigating the banks’
reserve management behavior as it includes the daily positions in the central bank of all
private banks in the system.
We identify the intra-day variables that govern the law of motion of overnight deposits
— the uncertain component banks face in setting their reserves. Empirically it is important
to allow this process to have time-varying volatility and certain time dummies. We examine
empirically how banks set their reserves in light of this uncertainty. Statistically, none
of the banks seem to have signiﬁcantly larger costs than what is predicted by the model.
This is a striking example in which economic agents do not seem to behave systematically
diﬀerent than what theory would predict. We show that model leads to reserve costs that
are signiﬁcantly lower than the costs that would be associated with the use of alternative
simple rule of thumb – lending further support to the model. Finally, although banks tend
to hold on average more reserves than the model predicts, there is little support that this is
due to some liquidity and reputation concerns.
14The same regression using operating proﬁts yields similar estimates – indicating the results with ﬁnancial
proﬁts are not merely a mechanical result.
15An additional interesting feature arising from informal inspection of Tables 4 and 5 suggests that
geographical location may also inﬂuence reserve costs. In particular the banks which appear signiﬁcantly
more eﬃcient than the model are regional banks. That is, they do not have branches nation wide and
their headquarters are outside Mexico City. Hence, the limited geographical dispersion may be helpful in
managing the reserve account.
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22A Data Sources
² Boletin Estadistico, Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores. This bulletin contains
the monthly accounting and statistical ﬁgures of the banks operating in the Mexican
Financial System. We use this source to obtain the ﬁnancial data given in Table 1
and the variables for the cross sectional evaluation. This source also provides measures
for ﬁnancial proﬁts fp, operating cost oc, as well as measures of non-performing loans
(npl) and liquidity. Non-performing loans are deﬁned as those loans that have not
received a payment in the last 6 months. Liquidity is deﬁned as vault cash, cash at
other banks and the central bank.
² Informacion Economica, Banco de Mexico. Database maintained on the World Wide
Web (www.banxico.org.mx) and updated by the Central Bank of Mexico. This data
source was used to obtain the US Dollar/Peso foreign exchange ﬁgures and the rates
of the primary auction of Government Bonds that is the base for the penalty rate rP
t .
² Modulo Banca. An information system at the Central Bank with a database that
keeps historical information of operations performed by ﬁnancial institutions. This
information includes all the operations aﬀecting the reserve account such as the clearing
house settlements (z1t;z2t), the fund transfers (ftt), the cash deposits (cdt) and the tax
related operations (txt). In like manner, this database contains the starting monthly
balances of the reserve account (yt) that is also used to compute the balance at the
time of the decision (y5t).
² Boletin Bursatil, Dinero y Valores, Bolsa Mexicana de Valores. Published by the
Mexican Stock Exchange (MSE), this bulletin contains general information of the
activity on the money and capital markets. The indicators include: the price index of
the MSE, the volume of operations in the capital market, the volume of operations in
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Accounts Proﬁts Proﬁts Proﬁts Proﬁts
1 154 134 770 37 14.6 5.1 2.4 7.9 22.9 9.2 0.03 0.02
2 928 867 5081 127 68.0 28.4 3.1 49.7 95.4 21.0 0.04 0.18
3 600 569 2970 100 56.3 -93.7 9.9 19.9 46.9 -8.0 0.06 0.35
4 669 604 4143 156 84.6 9.4 8.6 39.4 108.1 68.2 0.04 0.06
5 850 752 3213 117 69.0 9.9 4.8 27.8 144.9 99.4 0.02 0.03
6 873 850 2333 67 27.3 4.5 6.9 126.2 37.6 5.6 0.10 0.69
7 15669 14507 35492 761 876.6 1097.7 87.1 710.7 1096.1 705.0 0.03 0.05
8 801 745 3667 121 65.5 22.9 8.2 45.9 41.6 -9.3 0.07 0.31
9 8450 8068 20436 632 479.8 104.9 68.2 373.3 496.7 165.1 0.08 0.23
10 842 790 4289 130 51.5 11.1 27.1 54.6 88.9 39.2 0.03 0.08
11 1384 1318 6965 205 112.2 17.3 9.9 115.2 91.2 -19.1 0.05 0.26
12 1812 1678 7255 295 137.4 78.9 53.8 148.1 133.1 7.2 0.06 1.07
13 342 249 2877 71 29.5 6.92 5.1 15.8 80.3 66.0 0.02 0.02
14 3004 2852 12336 382 156.7 48.6 28.8 174.5 273.3 48.4 0.03 0.17
15 753 706 3397 87 46.5 27.8 4.5 140.9 80.0 17.0 0.04 0.21
16 18104 16980 29482 749 318.3 254.7 84.7 1052.7 1104.7 583.3 0.03 0.06
17 3429 3235 12209 345 279.2 - 798.2 30.5 166.3 293.5 107.0 0.12 0.32
18 747 719 985 22 8.8 -3.33 1.71 15.4 23.2 7.4 0.11 0.33
19 731 656 2767 103 27.6 10.4 8.91 35.3 77.2 44.3 0.03 0.06
Total 60143 56279 160667 4507 2909 799.4 454.3 3330.8 4336 1957 0.05 0.11
Financial ﬁgures for stock variables represent the status of the banks at the beginning of the sample
period. Financial ﬁgures for ﬂow variables are for the period from January 1990 until December
1990. All ﬁgures are in 1990 US dollars. Checking accounts are in thousands. Total Proﬁts =
ﬁnancial proﬁts + operating proﬁts - operating costs. Costs refer to the costs of managing the
reserve accounts. Data source: Boletin Estadistico, Comision Nacional Bancaria, December 1990.
As with other stock variables, reserves, non-performing loans NPL, and liquidity are as of January
1990, and are deﬁned in data appendix.
24Table 2
Summary Statistics for Operations and Reserves
Operations Value Std. Dev.
Fund Transfers 1,861 2,970 1,481
Cash Deposits 951 191 154
Tax Operations 240 421 210
Checks 2,858 9,863 3,640
Reserve Balance 713 154
The ﬁgures in this table pertain to 460 daily observations of the operations of 19 banks for the
period January 1990 to November 1991. The ﬁgures for Fund Transfers, Cash deposits, Tax Related
Operations and Checks include the sum of credits and debits. Operations refers to the average
number of operations in a day. Value refers to the average value of total operations in a day in
equivalent of millions of dollars. Std. Dev. refers to the standard deviation of the average amount
of operations in a day.
25Table 3 :Estimated coeﬃcients of the ARCH(1) regression on lnz2t
Bank c lnz2t¡1 t lnz1t lnz1t¡1 cdt ftt txt thut ®0 ®1 LRT Adj-R2
1 1.21 -0.12 0.07 0.55 0.15 -33.40 -20.68 -24.77 0.15 0.21 0.12 0.06 0.60
(0.15) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (10.40) (1.13) (2.55) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07)
2 1.65 -0.17 0.06 0.68 0.15 -5.54 -3.24 -4.11 0.06 0.06 0.17 < 0:01 0.73
(0.12) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (1.92) (0.13) (0.34) (0.04) (0.00) (0.06)
3 0.36 -0.19 0.05 0.82 0.25 -8.03 -5.04 -5.81 0.09 0.15 0.29 < 0:01 0.63
(0.20) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (1.67) (0.31) (0.52) (0.06) (0.01) (0.07)
4 2.14 -0.30 0.15 0.55 0.19 0.88 -6.12 -6.04 0.31 0.24 0.09 0.01 0.66
(0.17) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (5.53) (0.76) (0.79) (0.08) (0.02) (0.05)
5 1.90 -0.13 0.07 0.46 0.17 -18.13 -6.6 -8.08 0.24 0.18 0.05 0.31 0.50
(0.22) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (2.34) (0.53) (1.33) (0.08) (0.02) (0.04)
6 0.60 -0.15 0.01 0.89 0.16 -3.71 -1.83 -1.67 0.01 0.002 0.13 < 0:01 0.77
(0.14) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (2.77) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.000) (0.02)
7 1.36 -0.06 0.02 0.72 0.12 -0.03 -0.21 -0.23 0.03 0.004 0.157 < 0:01 0.89
(0.05) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.06)
8 1.71 -0.09 0.05 0.59 0.10 -8.19 -6.33 -6.20 0.24 0.09 0.00 0.90 0.72
(0.19) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (1.37) (0.27) (0.53) (0.06) (0.01) (0.04)
9 1.19 0.00 0.03 0.74 0.11 0.21 -0.42 -0.52 0.03 0.06 0.34 < 0:01 0.77
(0.22) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.33) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.07)
10 0.79 -0.19 0.07 0.83 0.19 -2.74 -2.42 -2.54 0.01 0.002 0.12 < 0:01 0.87
(0.12) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (1.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.03) (0.000) (0.01)
11 2.26 -0.06 0.01 0.46 0.15 -9.02 -3.35 -4.05 0.16 0.13 0.03 0.36 0.46
(0.24) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (1.91) (0.24) (0.31) (0.06) (0.01) (0.04)
12 1.27 -0.11 0.04 0.72 0.17 -2.69 -1.96 -2.71 -0.03 0.05 0.27 < 0:01 0.83
(0.12) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.98) (0.13) (0.23) (0.04) (0.00) (0.06)
13 1.46 -0.12 0.02 0.57 0.15 -15.64 -11.23 -10.93 0.36 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.78
(0.08) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (1.82) (1.11) (0.78) (0.06) (0.00) (0.07)
14 1.14 0.03 0.04 0.69 0.07 -2.75 -1.80 -1.95 0.12 0.07 0.21 < 0:01 0.76
(0.18) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.85) (0.09) (0.11) (0.05) (0.01) (0.07)
15 1.48 -0.06 0.09 0.54 0.17 -7.63 -2.74 -4.03 0.10 0.26 -0.02 0.87 0.42
(0.29) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (3.17) (0.18) (0.50) (0.07) (0.01) (0.03)
16 1.00 -0.12 0.01 0.80 0.17 -0.99 -0.88 -0.92 0.07 0.04 0.21 < 0:01 0.70
(0.25) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.26) (0.04) (0.14) (0.03) (0.00) (0.06)
17 0.86 -0.04 0.01 0.81 0.13 -0.42 -0.16 -0.17 0.05 0.01 0.54 < 0:01 0.91
(0.08) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.11)
18 0.86 -0.15 -0.06 0.77 0.20 11.33 -4.50 -8.40 0.03 0.27 -0.01 0.62 0.58
(0.22) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (14.69) (0.15) (2.76) (0.10) (0.01) (0.02)
19 0.52 -0.12 0.03 0.80 0.20 -11.39 -5.55 -6.30 0.033 0.04 0.16 < 0:01 0.87
(0.10) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (3.64) (0.23) (0.22) (0.03) (0.00) (0.04)
Entries are ARCH(1)-MLE estimates of lnz2t, where lnz2t = °0[1;t;CALt] +
PL
l=0 ¯lXt¡l + ut
and ht = E(u2
tju2
t¡1) = ®0 + ®1u2
t¡1. LRT is the p-value of the Likelihood Ratio Test comparing
homoskedastic and ARCH(1) lnz2t. t is time trend, lnz1t are check deposits, cdt are net cash
deposits and withdrawals, ftt is net fund transfers, txt is net operation related cash, and thut is
dummy for Thursdays. For Banks 7 and 10 we use a GARCH(1,1). The additional coeﬃcient on
lagged volatility is 0.81 (0.02) for bank 7 and 0.84 (0.04) for bank 10.
26Table 4
Testing the Reserve Decision Model (Wald Test)
bank Â2 p ¡ value ¯ yt+1 ¯ y¤
t+1
1 2.16 0.14 2.76 1.40
2 2.93 0.09 12.28 4.86
3 0.79 0.37 8.96 6.27
4 15.72 <0.01 14.41 3.45
5 5.09 0.02 8.26 2.05
6 0.07 0.79 13.52 13.29
7 3.69 0.06 125.81 65.41
8 7.94 <0.01 12.37 3.45
9 5.03 0.02 148.66 38.20
10 0.24 0.62 10.38 10.37
11 8.39 <0.01 22.19 4.15
12 8.32 <0.01 31.23 8.60
13 20.72 <0.01 7.91 1.3
14 2.70 0.10 29.26 11.02
15 1.28 0.26 13.00 6.06
16 6.53 0.01 88.72 18.98
17 0.29 0.59 133.51 67.20
18 22.99 <0.01 9.40 2.75
19 4.74 0.03 8.70 3.45




Actual vs. Estimated Cost




1 1.94 1.12 0.82 7.40 3.78 2.98 0.13 0.06
2 6.37 5.49 0.88 32.81 14.37 9.45 0.09 0.01
3 6.43 4.51 1.92 27.27 12.83 9.22 0.11 0.03
4 6.94 6.05 0.89 23.20 13.65 8.49 0.08 0.01
5 4.10 3.73 0.37 15.85 6.60 6.36 0.06 0.01
6 10.20 5.82 4.38 67.48 32.33 17.62 0.37 0.02
7 60.48 50.62 10.71 486.63 239.46 150.44 0.07 0.01
8 4.16 4.68 -0.52 19.81 9.15 8.12 0.06 -0.01
9 50.31 58.61 -8.30 269.99 136.17 62.73 0.10 -0.02
10 7.88 5.17 2.87 46.77 35.65 12.09 0.16 0.06
11 7.48 8.52 -1.06 32.89 11.96 11.56 0.07 -0.01
12 10.90 12.00 -1.10 58.30 34.57 14.96 0.08 -0.01
13 1.76 2.77 -1.01 8.48 4.59 3.16 0.06 -0.03
14 15.25 12.71 2.54 68.56 36.62 20.95 0.01 0.02
15 8.92 5.78 3.14 38.48 14.51 14.40 0.19 0.07
16 24.00 45.19 -21.19 140.12 51.16 30.86 0.08 -0.07
17 67.51 61.44 6.07 579.62 296.40 322.87 0.24 0.02
18 3.53 3.66 -0.13 18.85 8.44 5.85 0.40 -0.01




t+1) illustrates the opportunity and penalty cost, in millions of dollars, incurred
by a bank during our sample period. y¤
t+1 is the optimal end-of-day value given by the model.
Cob =
PT
t=1 Ct+1(yt+1) is the observed cost and yt+1 is the observed decision value. ∆ depicts
the diﬀerence between the cost generated by the use of the model of individual banks and the
actual cost ∆ = C¤ ¡ Cob. C¤(Eyt+1), describe the costs based setting the reserves according to
the previous day. C¤(z2t) provides the costs based on setting reserves to the previous days’s z2t.
C¤(Panel) illustrate the costs based on decision rules using the optimal decision y¤
t+1 generated by
the panel model. check depicts the number of checking accounts (in thousands) managed by each
bank.
28Table 6
Cross-Sectional Evaluation of yt+1 ¡ y¤
t+1, and Cob
Regressors
const. NPL Liquidity checks fp oc region R2
Panel A: Dependent variable – ¯ yi;t+1 ¡ ¯ y¤
i;t+1
10.11 4.73 21.99 0.73
(9.56) (2.29) (10.28)
17.89 4.94 38.57 0.65
(25.71) (3.89) (14.21)
Panel B: Dependent variable – yi;t+1 ¡ y¤
i;t+1: Pooled
2.69 3.18 18.92 0.32
(9.56) (1.89) (10.26)
12.47 2.04 26.18 0.24
(25.71) (1.19) (8.31)
Panel C: Dependent variable – Cob
2.69 0.18 -0.13 0.15 -0.05 0.77
(9.56) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03)
Results from regressing the cost of managing the reserve account Ci(yt+1) on ﬁnancial proﬁts
fpi, operating cost oci, checking accounts checki (thousands), and region. Liquidity and Non-
performing loans (NPL) are deﬁned in data appendix. The pooled regression pools uses the time
series of excess reserves on the 19 banks.
29Figure 1
Bank 6: Plot of lny5t vs. lny¤
5t
Figure 2
Bank 18: Plot of lny5t vs. lny¤
5t
30